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Why do some public organizations grow old and others die young? Since
Herbert Kaufman ﬁrst posed this question, considerable research has been
devoted to answering it. The ﬁndings of that research suggest that the
design of new public organizations affects, to a signiﬁcant degree, their
survival chances. In this article, we test whether and how “design factors”
affected the durability of the so-called New Deal organizations initiated
under FDR’s ﬁrst term. Our ﬁndings conﬁrm that design factors do matter,
but their effects change over time. We draw out some potential implications
for institutional design and sketch a renewed research agenda to determine
why some public organizations survive environmental pressure whereas
others succumb to it.
It has long been an article of faith among political scientists and public
administration scholars that government organizations live long and die
hard (Downs 1967; Lowi 1979). In his classic Are Government Organizations
Immortal? Herbert Kaufman (1976) set out to investigate the longevity of
these organizations. His “pilot investigation” found that the great majority
of U.S. federal organizations persist rather undisturbed. Kaufman (1976,
69) hypothesized that organizational survival is a function of organiza-
tional adaptability to environmental contingencies, but he was quick to
point out the limits of his ﬁndings.
More recently, David Lewis followed up on Kaufman’s pioneering
research with a large-scale study of U.S. federal organizations in the
period 1946–1997 (Lewis 2002, 2004; see also Carpenter and Lewis 2004).
Lewis (2002) found that governmental organizations are far from immor-
tal. In fact, many organizations in his population were terminated. Lewis
also offers a different explanation for the longevity of public organiza-
tions: Their survival appears to be a function of institutional design (Lewis
2002). Public organizations that are “endowed” with certain structural
features—such as political insulation, a speciﬁc organizational structure,
and statutory recognition—enjoy higher survival chances than those
without these birth characteristics.
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This is a remarkable ﬁnding. It suggests that by insulating a new public
organization from presidential interference, politicians can “hardwire” an
organization against future efforts to terminate it. If young organizations
can be infused with “some kind of natural immunity” to environmental
pressure, as Kaufman (1976, 1) mused and Lewis suggests, this could
have serious consequences for the practice of designing new public
organizations.
The idea that “design matters” ﬁnds support in rational choice theory,
in particular principal-agent models (cf. McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast
1989; Moe 1989). It resonates with the classic yet slightly discounted
premise in organization theory, which holds that an organization’s struc-
ture determines to a signiﬁcant degree its functioning and performance
(e.g., Galbraith 1977; Lorsch and Lawrence 1970). It chimes with the often
heard yet rarely investigated assertion that the early years of an organi-
zation signiﬁcantly affect its further development.1 It sits well with path
dependency theories, which explain why initial choices have long-term
effects on the future of an organization or policy sector (Krasner 1984;
Pierson 2000).
Design plays a far less prominent role, however, in theories of public
organizations, which tend to emphasize the importance of resources, con-
stituencies, interests, leaders, legitimacy, bureaucratic culture, and politics
(DiIulio 1994; Kaufman 1981; Wilson 1989). If empirical studies of public
organizations hold any advice for the designers of new organizations, it
would be the appointment of a “strong leader” and a record of high
performance, which provide a young public organization with a “shield”
against political interference (Doig and Hargrove 1987; Lewis 1980; Ric-
cucci 1995). In this line of thinking, organizational survival is a function of
adaptive capacity (cf. Aldrich 1999; Kaufman 1976).
The ﬁndings of Lewis (2002, 2004) thus pose a serious challenge to the
received wisdom in the ﬁeld of public organization research. They also
raise thorny questions. The idea of “hardwired” public organizations
reinforces a traditional and rather widespread fear of “run-away” public
bureaucracies that routinely defy political preferences and act on their
own accord (e.g., Boin and Goodin 2007; Goodsell 2003; Gouldner 1959;
Perrow 1986; Rose and Davies 1994; Wood and Waterman 1994). Lewis
(2004, 401) echoes a deep-seated concern when he asserts that “presidents
increasingly are faced with an accumulation of agencies over which they
have little control.”
This article scrutinizes the “design thesis” as forwarded by Lewis. We
study the effects of institutional design in a special population: the New
Deal organizations, which saw the light during President Franklin
Roosevelt’s ﬁrst term (1933–1936).
From a methodological perspective, the New Deal organizations con-
stitute an excellent test bed for the impact of design characteristics on
survival because we are able to hold constant a wide range of other birth
conditions. All of these organizations came about during an economic
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crisis, under a Democratic president, and under a Democrat-controlled
Congress, at a time when social reforms mediated by public bureaucracies
were quite novel. We thus are dealing with a relatively homogeneous set
of cases, which reduces the sensitivity to unobserved bias (Rosenbaum
2005).
In this article, we build on the work of Lewis (2003) and explore
whether design factors can explain the survival rate of the New Deal
organizations. It appears that “birth characteristics” of New Deal organi-
zations matter, but they matter in different ways and during different life
phases. This ﬁnding suggests that the capacity to adapt is as important as
clever design.
Explaining Durability: The Design Thesis
The thesis of “impressive durability” runs through much of the classic
work in classic public administration (Carpenter and Lewis 2004, 203).2
Yet public organizations do die. Kaufman (1976) found that 15% of the
U.S. federal agencies that existed in 1923 had disappeared in 1973. This
may not seem a high number, but Kaufman’s (1976, 27) selection of orga-
nizations was—as he readily admitted—biased “heavily in favor of con-
tinuity.” His database largely consisted of public organizations that had
been set up under the Constitution of 1789. In other words, these were
organizations that at the time reﬂected the core functions of the state,
which, we may assume, are subject to less alteration than the public
organizations and policy aims that saw the light during the more expan-
sive government of the twentieth century.3 Indeed, Lewis (2003) found
that not even 40% of the 426 U.S. federal organizations that existed in
1946 still existed in 1997.4
This leaves us with the question of why some public organizations die
whereas others persist. The simplest and most plausible explanation for an
organization’s demise is perhaps a functional one. It holds that an orga-
nization that no longer serves its original purpose because that purpose
has been rendered obsolete faces inevitable termination. The Selective
Service System, for instance, was a powerful public agency until the Pen-
tagon decided to shift toward an all-volunteer army. The Steamboat
Inspection Service, the Bituminous Coal Commission, and the Fixed
Nitrogen Research Lab clearly belong to a different era.
But there are (too) many examples that undermine a functional expla-
nation. Some organizations last surprisingly long. The U.S. Bureau of
Mining was established in the early twentieth century to increase the
safety of mine workers. This bureau survived radical change in the indus-
try as well as the creation (1973) of a rival agency—the Mining Enforce-
ment and Safety Administration—with the same mission (regulate and
inspect mine safety). In 1995, the incoming Republican majority suddenly
denied the U.S. Bureau of Mining its appropriation and dismantled the
organization within three months (more than 1,200 employees lost their
LIFE AND DEATH OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS 387
jobs). In the same year, Congress eliminated the Federal Helium Reserve,
an agency created in the 1920s to supply the nation’s ﬂeet of helium-ﬁlled
airships (Light 1999, 502). The same Congress also targeted the United
States Geological Services for termination, but this organization “persisted
as it had since its creation in 1879” (Lewis 2002, 89).
An alternative and more solid explanation combines two types of expla-
nations. The ﬁrst type focuses on environmental dynamics that create politi-
cal opportunities to initiate termination efforts. It points out that political
preferences, priorities, and perceptions change over time, budgets
decrease, and coalitions shift. Such dynamics may suddenly cast the
routine performance of a public organization—its accomplishments and
its failures—in a different light. It may provide a window of opportunity
for political entrepreneurs to politicize the performance of a public orga-
nization (Kingdon 1984), which allows incoming majorities to terminate
pet organizations of losing incumbents, especially if these organizations
embody the political aspirations of the losers (cf. Carpenter and Lewis
2004). In this line of argument, political turnover exposes vulnerable orga-
nizations to the threat of termination.
The second explanation identiﬁes the birth characteristics that render a
public organization more or less vulnerable to such termination efforts
(Kaufman 1976; Lewis 2003). Durability then becomes a function of design
or birth characteristics. This explanation recognizes that political founders
of new organizations may try to protect their “offspring” from future
interference by political opponents—especially future presidents with a
different agenda—through “hardwiring”: insulating the young organiza-
tion from the environmental dynamics described above.5
In his analysis of federal organizations, Lewis (2002, 2003) found that
structural insulation from potential political interference is a powerful
predictor of organizational survival. A new agency that is placed outside
existing bureaucratic agencies, is headed by ofﬁcials who serve ﬁxed
terms, and has party limitations on appointments runs a signiﬁcantly
lower risk of termination than counterparts without these design features
(Lewis 2003, 154). Organizations without a statutory origin appear espe-
cially vulnerable: organizations established by executive order tend to be
abolished more easily (cf. Kaufman 1976). It seems fair to conclude that a
young public organization endowed with a formal degree of autonomy
enjoys better survival chances.6
This “design” explanation runs counter to received wisdom in the ﬁeld
of public administration, which holds that organizations and policies
rarely, if ever, follow blueprints or “design” requirements (Feldman 1988;
Goodin 1996; Handler 1986; Hood 1976; Kaufman 1971; Van Gunsteren
1976). These authors suggest that institutional adaptation, ﬂexibility, and
resilience may be more important, allowing public organizations to escape
their impending termination by reinventing themselves.7 Moreover, the
“design explanation” revives serious questions about the desirability of
institutional design. If it were possible to design public organizations into
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perpetuity, this could have grave consequences for the democratic nature
of such institutions.
We decided to submit the design thesis—as forwarded by Lewis—to an
additional, rigorous test. We selected a population of organizations that
were set up in an era marked by societal crisis: the New Deal organiza-
tions. The New Deal arguably marked the beginning of massive govern-
ment intervention through the creation of public organizations (Arnold
1986; Egger 1975). These organizations were initiated by a president and
Congress that had little experience in institutional design. In fact, these
organizations were established during a time when the merits of design
and the legitimacy of extensive administrative policymaking were in
serious question.
Hastily conceived and heavily targeted, this population would seem
extremely vulnerable to extermination efforts down the road. If we ﬁnd
that the surviving organizations possessed the birth characteristics that
are thought to enhance durability, we will have an extremely solid conﬁr-
mation of the design thesis. Let us now see how the design thesis fared in
this population.
Revisiting the New Deal Organizations: Population Characteristics
In this article, we explore whether the design factors identiﬁed by Lewis
can explain the survival variance in the population of New Deal organi-
zations set up between 1933 and 1936.8 During this period, 63 federal
organizations were created (see the Appendix). Some have subsequently
become lasting institutions (think of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the
Social Security Administration, and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion), while others have quietly disappeared. In 2007, 16 of these organi-
zations (25%) still existed.
Most New Deal organizations either perished at a fairly young age or
grew respectably old (few died middle-aged). Roughly half (54%) of the
New Deal organizations did not live longer than 12 years, which corre-
sponds with the early death rate found by Lewis (49%).9 These organiza-
tions were abolished during the 73rd to 79th Congress (see Figure 1),
which means they never saw a Republican Congress or president. The
New Deal thus “ate quite a few of its own children.”10
Intriguingly, 83% of all perished New Deal organizations were abol-
ished by a Democratic president and Congress, whereas Democrats abol-
ished only 45% of the perished organizations in Lewis’s population.
Republican presidents and majorities can only claim 15% of the New Deal
casualties. The Reagan administration, with its promise to cutback on
bureaucracy, did not abolish a single New Deal organization.
The 16 surviving New Deal organizations weathered various wars, 12
presidents, three decades of Republican rein, major recessions, the advent
of the computer age, the backlash against “big government,” and the rise
of New Public Management. Were these lasting institutions “hardwired”
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for survival during their birth? Did the nonsurvivors lack institutional
safeguards against presidential intervention? To answer these questions,
we checked whether and how (combinations of) birth characteristics relate
to the durability of New Deal organizations.
We collected data on all U.S. federal government organizations estab-
lished during the ﬁrst years of the New Deal. Following Lewis, we
selected the organizations that were newly listed in the United States
Government Manual (USGM) of 1935, 1936, and 1937.11 This data set
includes cabinet departments, administrations, bureaus, commissions,
boards, government corporations, and large ofﬁces. It excludes bureaus
and ofﬁces that were too small to be included in the USGM.
We should note how difﬁcult it can be to determine what constitutes
a new organization and when one is abolished (Emmerich 1971;
Whitnah 1983). Organizations that were the result of a merger or that
were split off from existing organizations (e.g., a division of a bureau
that becomes a separate bureau) are here considered new. In case of
doubt, we considered whether the new entry in the USGM had (1) a
new name, (2) an organization chart that differed from its predecessor,
and (3) new leadership.12
We use the same criteria to determine whether an organization has
been terminated. A merger of organizations or a split into two or more
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organizations counts as a termination. When organizations are only
changed in name and some of their functions, they are not considered to
be abolished.13
Our population of 63 is considerably smaller than the one studied by
Lewis. Appropriate caution should be taken in generalizing the results to
a larger population of public organizations. But while relatively small, the
size of this population does allow us to draw statistically sound conclu-
sions. The use of a survival analysis (or event duration analysis) creates an
N that equals each agency times the number of years it existed (n = 1,854).
This number of observations makes for robust conclusions.
Following Lewis (2003), we coded the New Deal organizations on the
dependent variable (age/survival) and a set of design attributes (location,
hierarchical independence, sunset, legislative underpinning, governing
structure). We studied the absence or presence of these organizational
attributes in the ﬁrst two years of the organization’s existence and related
them to the age of the organization (see Table 1 for the organizational
attributes of this sample). In addition, we coded for several controls per-
taining to organization type and the political and economic conditions
throughout an organization’s life. Let us now describe these variables in
more detail.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is organizational life span, which is measured as the
duration in years between the creation and termination of an organization.
The termination year is the year when the organization was formally
abolished, absorbed in a merger, or split into two or more entities. Sixteen
organizations (about 25%) were not terminated by the end of 2007, the end
of our observation period, and will hence be treated as right-censored
cases (Kleinbaum and Klein 2005).
We use the survivor function to obtain a ﬁrst impression of the likeli-
hood of survival past a certain time point. Figure 2 shows the Kaplan–
Meier estimate of this function, including the 95% conﬁdence interval. The
survival function drops off steeply for durations up to 20 years and then
evens out. The probability of surviving past 10 years is slightly over 0.5 (by
point estimate), suggesting a relatively short life span for most organiza-
tions that were created during Roosevelt’s ﬁrst term. On the other hand,
the location of the asymptote of the survivor function suggests that long-
term survival chances are signiﬁcantly better than nil, a ﬁnding that is
explained by the 16 organizations that continue to survive.Another way to
look at survival prospects is that 19 (30.2%) of the organizations existed for
5 years or less, while 20 (31.7%) survived for at least 50 years.
Independent Variables
The ﬁrst independent variable is location, which refers to the organiza-
tion’s proximity to the president. It is measured on a scale that runs from
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1 to 5. Lewis (2003) hypothesized that a location near to the president
would make it easier to abolish an organization. Agencies located in the
executive ofﬁce score 1, while government corporations or agencies
located in the judicial or legislative branch score 5. Agencies located in the
cabinet score 2, independent administrations are coded 3, and indepen-
dent commissions are coded 4. Following Lewis (2003), we expect a negative
effect from close proximity to the president; increased distance should make an
organization less vulnerable to termination.
The second attribute that we consider is hierarchical independence. Lewis
(2003) suspected that an organization’s formal position—being placed in
or outside existing organizational structures—could affect its survival
prospects. A case scores 0 if it is a (sub)division of an existing public
organization or operates in another form under the direct formal authority
of a public organization. If the new organization operates outside the
TABLE 1
Organizational Attributes of the Sample
Attribute N %
Average
LifeSpan
(years)
Independence (created without any layers of
bureaucratic organization above it):
Agency inside bureaucracy 36 57.1 22.8
Agency outside bureaucracy 27 42.9 35.9
Commission/board structure:
Absent 33 52.4 23.6
Present 30 47.6 33.7
Location within a cabinet department:
No 42 66.7 32.3
Yes 21 33.3 20.6
Creation by executive or departmental order:
No 55 87.3 31.3
Yes 8 12.7 8.5
Creation by law:
No 38 60.3 22.8
Yes 25 39.7 36.9
Sunset clause:
Absent 52 82.5 29.8
Present 11 17.5 21.6
Relief organization:
No 55 87.3 31.3
Yes 8 12.7 8.1
Type of organization:
Foreign affairs 2 3.2 43.0
Social policy 21 33.3 21.3
Monetary policy 24 38.1 33.6
General 16 25.4 28.0
Note: N = 63.
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direct inﬂuence sphere of any other bureau, administration, commission,
or corporation, it scores 1. We expect that organizational independence will
increase the life span of a new organization.
Third, we consider whether an organization has a board or commission
structure. This predictor indicates whether the new organization is headed
by a board, a commission, or a single administrator (who tends to be
politically appointed). A case scores 1 if the organization is headed by a
commission or a board. Sometimes the USGM explicitly mentions this;
often the commission/board members are listed as such. A case scores 0 if
it has no listing of a commission, no board, or when the USGM explicitly
mentions a single administrator. Lewis (2003) expected agencies with a
commission or board structure to be relatively immune to political
appointments and thus to political turnover and presidential interference.
It follows, then, that a positive relationship can be expected between the pres-
ence of a board/commission structure and an organization’s longevity.
Our fourth predictor is insulation from the executive. Insulation is a
recode of the location variable discussed above. Speciﬁcally, we used two
dichotomous variables for indicating the distance to the president (or what
Lewis calls “political insulation”).14 We simply coded whether or not an
FIGURE 2
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agency is part of the executive ofﬁce/cabinet structure. Sticking with
Lewis’s (2003) ﬁndings, we expect a negative relationship between an orga-
nization’s proximity to the executive ofﬁce and its survival prospects.
Fifth, we consider the legislative origin of the New Deal organizations.
Lewis (2003) discerns four different categories of statutory underpinning:
(1) by legislation, (2) by reorganizationplan, (3) by executive order, or (4) by
departmental order. As the information on this variable (as captured in the
USGM) was limited, we collapsed Lewis’s categories into two categories of
statutory origin (weak or strong). The “strong” category includes those
organizations established by law,while the “weak” category includes those
organizations created by departmental or executive order, without a legis-
lative mandate. The middle categories serve as the baseline. We determine
for each case whether or not it was created by law, which means that
Congress voted in favor of legislation drafted to establish the organization
at hand. We expect statutory recognition by law to enhance survival. Corre-
spondingly, organizations that were initiated by departmental or executive order
should display greater mortality rates.
The sixth predictor is the presence of a sunset clause. Some organizations
die young because they were never intended to grow old (e.g., project
organizations). These organizations are designed to be terminated after
fulﬁlling their mission. We therefore check for each organization in our
population whether a so-called sunset clause formally limited its life span.
A case scores 0 on this predictor if nothing is stipulated in the USGM at the
time of its creation. The organization scores 1 if it was created with a sunset
clause, markers of which are a ﬁxed budget or the stipulation of an ofﬁcial
cutoff date. It follows from the intentional temporality indicated by a
sunset clause that we expect a negative relationship between the presence of
such a clause and an organization’s life span.
Following Lewis (2003), we control for unemployment rate, major wars
(0,1),15 presidential second terms (0,1), new administrations (0,1), the pres-
ence of an unfriendly (i.e., Republican dominated) House (0,1), and the
presence of an unfriendly (i.e., Republican) president (0,1).16 The coding of
these variables is similar to Lewis (2003).
We added two control variables, which appear especially relevant for
this particular population. The ﬁrst of these marks whether the organiza-
tion was a relief organization or not. During the New Deal, several relief
organizations were created to deal with the deep poverty and steep unem-
ployment rates that deﬁned the era. Mission completion could take away
an organization’s reason for existence, which, it stands to reason, would
cut its life short (even in the absence of a formal sunset clause). A second
control variable is based on Lowi’s (1979) distinction between different
policy sectors and characterizes organizations as being constitutive, dis-
tributive, redistributive, or regulatory. We include this predictor to
capture the potential that organizational hazard rates vary by policy
domain. For analytical purposes, we have created three dummy variables,
treating constitutive policy agencies as the baseline category.
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Findings and Discussion
We analyze organizational survival analogously to Lewis (2003) by using
an event duration model. A Cox regression model is a common choice for
analyzing duration data that are censored and non-normally distributed.17
We implement this model using Efron’s method for handling ties, which
allows for different organizations to be terminated at the same point in
time. The Cox model assumes that the effect of predictors remains con-
stant over survival time (the proportional hazard assumption). This
assumption is violated in several cases; where this happens, we have
opted for the standard solution of interacting the predictor with the log of
survival time.
Agency Location and Survival
We begin by considering the effect of agency location, that is, an agency’s
distance from the president. We use different models, one containing
covariates similar to Lewis (2003) and two others considering two addi-
tional agency attributes: (1) whether an organization is a relief organiza-
tion or not and (2) agency type. By using different model speciﬁcations we
can assess the robustness of the results.
Table 2 shows the estimates of three different model speciﬁcations.
Model 1 corresponds most closely to Lewis’s (2003) speciﬁcation. The
location effect estimated here is both signiﬁcant and in the expected nega-
tive direction. Thus, as agencies are further removed from the president
they are less at risk of dissolution. Speciﬁcally, for a unit increase in
distance, the hazard decreases by roughly 20%. This ﬁnding is consistent
with Lewis (2003).18
The result for location is not very robust, however. As soon as we
include the additional controls, the effect of location becomes statistically
insigniﬁcant (Model 2). Upon further examination, it turns out that this
insigniﬁcance is due to the time-varying effect of location that emerges
once the additional controls are included. Model 3 takes this into consid-
eration and leads to a fundamentally different appraisal of location effects
on agency survival. Initially, close proximity to the president actually
enhances the prospect of agency survival. Only in the longer run does it
become a liability and is a more distal location beneﬁcial. The tipping
point lies around 4.4 years (see Figure 3).
The changing character of the location effect with changing model
speciﬁcations is, of course, only of interest if one accepts the need for
additional controls. From a statistical perspective, it clearly is necessary to
include agency type and note whether the New Deal organization was a
relief organization.A Wald test setting the effects of the additional controls
to zero yields a test statistic of 29.29, P < 0.01, revealing the statistical
importance of those predictors.19
From a substantive perspective, it is also clear that the controls add a
great deal to our understanding of agency survival. For instance, we learn
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that agency survival is negatively affected when an agency faces an
unfriendly House of Representatives and positively (compared with con-
stitutive agencies) when it is involved with redistributive policies. We also
see that relief organizations initially tend to face less risk but that this
reverses over time (the tipping point is just below ﬁve years). This result
likely reﬂects the fact that these agencies were constituted to address the
severe poverty and unemployment that characterized the early 1930s.
After these problems subsided, their raison d’être disappeared (sunset
clauses had little if anything to do with this). Finally, we observe that
distributive organizations faced less risk initially and greater risk later on
(with a tipping point around 13.8 years).
In sum, our results reveal a more complex pattern than Lewis (2003)
found. Without additional controls, we replicate his result (greater
TABLE 2
Agency Location and Survival
Predictor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Location -0.230** -0.162 0.430
(0.116) (0.161) (0.325)
Location ¥ ln(t) -0.291*
(0.148)
War -0.379 0.201 0.290
(0.623) (0.657) (0.629)
New president 0.786 0.591 0.767
(0.540) (0.588) (0.652)
Second term -0.469 -0.331 -0.478
(0.630) (0.586) (0.586)
Unfriendly president -0.028 -0.451 -0.730
(0.994) (1.229) (1.035)
Unfriendly House 1.394 2.156† 2.069†
(0.991) (1.115) (1.151)
Unemployment -0.019 0.021 0.036
(0.095) (0.093) (0.095)
Relief organization -10.190** -10.240**
(3.585) (3.585)
Relief organization ¥ ln(t) 6.410** 6.436**
(1.792) (1.797)
Distributive organization -2.372† -3.181**
(1.241) (1.161)
Distributive org. ¥ ln(t) 0.829† 1.210**
(0.435) (0.394)
Redistributive organization -1.300* -1.294*
(0.612) (0.592)
Regulatory organization -0.265 -0.222
(0.459) (0.467)
Pseudo log-likelihood -165.646 -149.809 -148.061
Notes: Table entries are maximum likelihood estimates of the Cox proportional hazards
model using the Efron method for handling ties. Cluster-corrected estimates appear in
parentheses, where clustering is on organization id. N = 1,854. **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05, †P < 0.10
(two-tailed).
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distance to the president protects agencies from dissolution). With addi-
tional controls, however, distance appears to have two effects: Initially it
puts agencies at risk and only in the longer run does it protect them
against termination. To complicate matters even further, our recode of this
variable provides different results yet again (see below).
Agency Structure and Survival
Let us now take a more detailed look at the other variables. Again, our
strategy is to estimate models with Lewis’s (2003) controls (Model 1) as
well as a more extensive set of control variables (Model 2). The results are
displayed in Table 3.
Model 1 suggests, in accordance with Lewis’s ﬁndings, that several
design characteristics contribute signiﬁcantly to survival. Yet the charac-
teristics that attain statistical signiﬁcance turn out to have time-varying
effects: Somewhere in history, the impact of the characteristics reverses
signs.20 Allowing for time variation appears to be statistically prudent:
Wald c2 = 10.14, P < 0.05, testing the null hypothesis that our independent
variables do not interact with survival time.
FIGURE 3
The Impact of Agency Location on Risk
Notes: Graph shows predicted hazard rates for a unit increase in agency
location as a function of survival time. The dashed reference line marks
whether the hazard rate is greater or less than 1.
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TABLE 3
Agency Structure and Survival
Predictor Model 1 Model 2
Sunset clause 0.581 0.509
(0.413) (0.451)
Commission/board structure 3.598* 3.447*
(1.499) (1.607)
Structure ¥ ln(t) -1.881* -1.851*
(0.794) (0.874)
Independence 1.407† 1.987*
(0.795) (0.987)
Independence ¥ ln(t) -0.892* -1.171**
(0.367) (0.442)
Located inside the executive -0.134 0.043
(0.378) (0.396)
Created by executive order 0.470 0.695
(0.410) (0.448)
Created by law 0.038 0.358
(0.397) (0.540)
War 0.195 0.417
(0.786) (0.750)
New president 1.008† 0.956
(0.536) (0.582)
Second term -0.972 -0.834
(0.717) (0.638)
Unfriendly president -1.405 -1.475
(1.346) (1.367)
Unfriendly House 1.808 2.215*
(1.153) (1.093)
Unemployment 0.014 0.015
(0.098) (0.091)
Relief organization -6.213
(4.084)
Relief organization ¥ ln(t) 4.841*
(2.059)
Distributive organization 0.166
(0.455)
Redistributive organization -5.378**
(1.962)
Redistributive org. ¥ ln(t) 1.773*
(0.733)
Regulatory organization 0.561
(0.475)
Pseudo log-likelihood -148.485 -134.846
Notes: Table entries are maximum likelihood estimates of the Cox proportional hazards
model using the Efron method for handling ties. Cluster-corrected estimates appear in
parentheses, where clustering is on organization ID. N = 1,854. **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05, †P < 0.10
(two-tailed).
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This pattern does not change with the additional controls in Model 2.As
before, these controls are substantively important, as well as statistically
necessary: Wald c2 = 31.95, P < 0.01. Again, the impact of agency location,
having a committee or board structure, and being independent changes
over time (Wald c2 = 9.08, P < 0.05).
Contrary to our expectation, having a committee/board structure
increases an agency’s risk initially. Only after around 6.5 years does this
design feature seem to work to the advantage of an agency’s survival (see
Figure 4). Independence shows a similar pattern. Initially a liability, it
becomes an asset for survival after about 5.5 years (see Figure 5).
Insulation, on the other hand, shows the reversed pattern. It protects
agencies from dissolution in the short run but puts them in harm’s way in
the longer run, the tipping point being around 14 years (i.e., after FDR’s
presidency; see Figure 6). This ﬁnding is closer to Lewis’s ﬁndings than
the location variable, but it still shows time-dependence effects. From a
statistical perspective, it appears that this recode provides a better way of
measuring the inﬂuence of the executive than the location variable dis-
cussed above.
FIGURE 4
The Impact of Committee/Board Structure on the Hazard Rate
Notes: Graph shows the predicted hazard rate for agencies with a
committee/board structure as a function of survival time. The dashed
reference line marks the hazard for agencies with a different kind of
organizational structure.
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These results are considerably more complex than those reported by
Lewis (2003). While he ﬁnds unidirectional effects of agency structure, we
ﬁnd that for our set of agencies, the effects change directions as a function
of time at risk. Aside from location, insulation, committee/board struc-
ture, and independence, we observe no signiﬁcant effects from agency
attributes that were in place at the time of inception.21 The lack of a
signiﬁcant sunset clause effect is particularly intriguing: There is no appar-
ent statistical association between providing an explicit agency termina-
tion date and the agency’s longevity.
In summary, we can formulate two conclusions about the impact of
institutional design on the survival of New Deal agencies. First, while
three design variables attain statistical signiﬁcance at conventional levels
and another one emerges with a more generous choice of signiﬁcance
level, several of the design variables do not. Second, the effect of design
choices does not appear to be constant. What looks like an excellent design
choice in the short run in terms of agency location may become ineffective
or perhaps even a liability in the longer run. Conversely, what looks like a
bad design choice (e.g., commission/board structure) in the short run may
prove to be an excellent design choice in the long run.
FIGURE 5
The Impact of Independence on the Hazard Rate
Notes: Graph shows the predicted hazard rate for independent agencies as
a function of survival time. The dashed reference line marks the hazard for
nonindependent agencies.
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Discussing Design Effects
Our results sketch a somewhat different picture of the relation between
agency design and survival than Lewis’s (2003) results did. The effects of
the variables change as the organizations age. Static generalizations about
organizational lifetimes are not possible for our population.
The unique character of the New Deal population may explain at least
part of the difference. The New Deal agencies were the brain children of a
single administration and came into the world under unique economic,
social, and political conditions. This combination of era and circumstances
may well have played a role.
Our ﬁndings, however, may also implicate that the relation between
agency design and survival sometimes is less straightforward than
Lewis’s (2003) ﬁndings suggest. Other factors may be at play.
Consider, for instance, the effects of sunset clauses. Even if there is a
hint in our data that sunset clauses diminish the survival prospects of a
new federal organization, the real question is why some New Deal orga-
nizations managed to survive such a clause. We must conclude that it is at
least possible for public organizations to survive beyond ﬁrmly set execu-
tion dates.
FIGURE 6
The Impact of Insulation on the Hazard Rate
Notes: Graph shows the predicted hazard rate for insulated agencies as a
function of survival time. The dashed reference line marks the hazardfor
noninsulated/exposed agencies.
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It is not hard to think of other factors that may be at play here. Perhaps
some organizations somehow convince their patrons that life extension is
beneﬁcial to them and therefore necessary.Alternatively, we may speculate
that the very existence of a sunset clause provides temporary if unin-
tended refuge from critics: As the demise of the organization is seemingly
guaranteed, why would opponents waste their time criticizing and attack-
ing it?22 A sunset clause may serve as a powerful incentive for employees
to perform well and prove that the organization is indispensable or to
reinvent it before the bell tolls. A complementary hypothesis would
speculate that sunset clauses serve a symbolic function during the concep-
tion phase, when critics need to be assured that the new organization will
be terminated in time.
The idea that some organizations manage to overcome their “birth
defects” ﬁts the work of organization theorists who have documented
how some public organizations reinvent their original missions and tailor
their appearance to placate and please external stakeholders (Meyer and
Rowan 1977; Perrow 1986; Selznick 1949; Wilson 1989). It ﬁts Kaufman’s
(1976) hunch that “organizational adaptation” is a key variable. Further-
more, it supports Lewis’s (2004) hypothesis that congruence between an
organization’s performance and Congressional preferences (gauged in
terms of the legislative median’s ideal point) is a crucial factor determin-
ing an organization’s survival chances.
This line of reasoning sits well with the received wisdom that a public
organization must earn its legitimacy (Suchman 1995; Wilson 1989). It is
certainly helpful if organizational leaders can build their organization
under protective guard, providing the organization with a honeymoon
period during which it can ﬁnd an effective and legitimate way of oper-
ating (cf. Boin and Christensen 2008). But insulation cannot save a young
organization from widely perceived underperformance.
Conclusion: Explaining Organizational Durability (Revisited)
The purpose of this article has been to assess the impact of institutional
design characteristics on the durability of New Deal organizations. We
found that design features (or “birth characteristics”) do matter, but they
matter in different ways during the different life phases of public organi-
zations. In its early years, they may protect an organization against the
potential effects of environmental dynamics. But these beneﬁcial effects
may well work against an organization as it matures and becomes
institutionalized.
All this suggests that our capacity to design public organizations for the
long run is limited. This seems a plausible suggestion. Agency designers
need to take heed of the risks that an agency runs here and now. However,
they also need to anticipate future risks, which may be of a fundamentally
different nature. What protects an agency in the short run may expose it in
the long run and vice versa. Even if agency designers recognize the
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time-varying effects of design features, they may have a great deal of
uncertainty about the exact location of the tipping point.
This may dispel some of the fear and suspicion that surround efforts
of institutional design (cf. Boin and Goodin 2007). Some of the worst
fears evoked by strong public institutions—such as shirking, uninhibited
rent seeking, and blind pursuit of formal goals—would be well founded
if a legislature or executive could not provide an agency with a credible
threat of termination. The capacity to “hardwire” a public organization
against future interference would essentially deprive future legislatures
and executives of such a threat. It might take away an organization’s
incentives to adapt to a changing policy environment, which, in turn,
would undermine its capacity to perform in an effective and responsive
manner. It could, in other words, create a population of recalcitrant
organizations that may be less interested to serve the needs of
citizens.
To be sure, our analysis of New Deal agencies does not refute the design
thesis as forwarded by Lewis. It does leave us with new questions. Our
analysis shows that institutional design factors cannot fully explain the
observed variance in durability of New Deal organizations. Well-protected
New Deal organizations suffered early deaths, whereas seemingly
exposed organizations have grown into public institutions that mark the
American federal landscape today. Organization theory suggests alterna-
tive and plausible explanations, but these will have to be subjected to
systematic analysis.
We propose a three-step strategy. The ﬁrst step would take us back to
the drawing board. It would be helpful to make a clear distinction between
the politics of organizational creation (Grafton 1975), the early years of
institutional development (Boin and Christensen 2008), the politics of
agency adaptation and persistence (Doig 2001; Hargrove 1994; Wood and
Waterman 1994), and the politics of agency termination (cf. Bardach 1976;
Behn 1978). In addition, more work should be done to clearly deﬁne the
crucial concepts of organizational birth and death.
The second step would consist of empirical exploration of selected New
Deal organizations. We would study those organizations that were estab-
lished as permanent tools for government intervention but were abolished
in an early stage (such as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the
National Recovery Administration, and the National Resources Planning
Board). Could it be that they failed to establish legitimate routines and
practices that were valued by their environment and that enhanced their
performance? In addition, we would probe into the institutional histories
of such highly contested organizations as the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the Rural Electriﬁcation Administration to see how they
survived. How did they manage to strike root? Anecdotic evidence sug-
gests that an understanding of organizational life cycles would beneﬁt
from studying the execution of leadership tasks (Mashaw 1983; Parrish
1970; Selznick 1957).
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The ﬁnal step would be to test the resulting hypotheses in other popu-
lations (including the one studied by Lewis). Only then can we tell if our
ﬁndings are just an artifact of the New Deal era or reﬂect dynamics that
emerge in other populations as well.
The most important ﬁnding of this article tells us that there is no silver
bullet—no magic combination of design options—that will guarantee
organizational survival. It would seem that the name of the game is not
design for survival but design for adaptation. The best that designers may be
able to do is to endow the organization with sufﬁcient ﬂexibility to adapt.
Future research should investigate whether it is the ability to scan the
environment and change one’s organizational structure and mission that
make it possible to survive long after the original raison d’être has ceased
to exist.
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Notes
1. As Seidman (1998, 138) puts it, “the ﬁrst organization decision is crucial. The
course of institutional development may be set irrevocably by the initial
choice of administrative agency and by how the program is designed.”
According to Stinchcombe’s (1965) “liability of newness” thesis, short-term
survival pretty much ensures immortality.
2. Many researchers have wondered why some organizations “live” longer
than others (Aldrich 1999; Carpenter and Lewis 2004; Hager et al. 1996;
Kaufman 1976; Lewis 2002; Stinchcombe 1965; Strange 1998). In this section,
we brieﬂy summarize the most common explanations for survival of public
organizations.
3. Moreover, Kaufman did not take into account the organizations that were
created after 1923 or abolished prior to 1973 (organizations that existed
brieﬂy somewhere between these years were not included), which further
biased his ﬁndings toward continuity.
4. Whereas Kaufman may have been somewhat conservative in his selection,
Lewis adopted criteria that may have biased his ﬁndings toward a higher
mortality rate (Lewis, for instance, coded a combination of name and
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function change as an organizational death whereas Kaufman spoke
of organizational death only when the “boundaries around a group” had
disappeared).
5. The term “hardwiring” is not well deﬁned. It may refer to making a credible
commitment to not exercising inﬂuence over an agency after it is created
(McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989). Or it may refer to including in the
agency’s design features that increase its durability (insulating the agency
from the inﬂuence of others). We use the latter deﬁnition, which we para-
phrase from Lewis (2002, 103).
6. Insulation is closely related to the concept of political autonomy. The idea
that autonomy positively inﬂuences survival ﬁnds support in other studies.
Political autonomy is generally considered an important characteristic of
thriving and surviving public organizations (Boin 2001; Carpenter 2001;
Lewis 2002, 2003; Sapolsky 1972; Selznick 1949; Wilson 1989). Wolf (1993)
tested and conﬁrmed the hypothesized positive relationship between
autonomy and bureaucratic effectiveness. If we accept that the effectiveness
of an organization will positively affect its reputation, we may infer that
autonomy increases the likelihood of survival.
7. Classic examples include the Tennessee Valley Authority and the New York
Port Authority (Hargrove 1994 and Doig 2001, respectively). The emphasis
on adaptation corresponds with key ﬁndings in the literature on the rise and
fall of civilizations (Diamond 2005; Tainter 1988).
8. Historians and political scientists do not always agree on the exact time
boundaries of the New Deal period. Some consider only the ﬁrst 100 days of
FDR’s presidency, others the ﬁrst eight years. We adopt the period that
corresponds with FDR’s ﬁrst term.
9. Carpenter and Lewis (2004) show that the hazard rate for federal organiza-
tions established after 1946 is substantially higher than average during the
ﬁrst 10–12 years of their lives. This is in line with ﬁndings of studies on
business organizations (Brüderl and Schüssler 1990; Fichman and Levinthal
1991; Henderson 1999).
10. The observation is Erwin Hargrove’s (personal communication).
11. The inclusion of an organization in the USGM provides “an easy, unbiased
decision rule and indicates their importance” (Lewis 2003, codebook). The
USGM was ﬁrst published in 1935.
12. Here we depart from Lewis (2003), who considered an organization “new”
if it had a new name and different functions from any previously existing
agencies. The criteria used by Lewis result in signiﬁcantly more creations
and terminations. Using his criteria, the life span of the National Archives
and Records Administration (see next footnote) would have added an extra
creation and terminations to our data set (the same goes for the Social
Security Administration).
13. In our view, the creation of the National Archives and Records Service
(NARS) in 1949 did not qualify as a new organization because we see a
strong continuity of the National Archives as established in 1934 (McCoy
1978). Wayne Grover remained the leader of the NARS. The organization
remained in the same building, with the same staff.
14. We suspected that the limited number of New Deal agencies could distort
our ﬁndings. In order to capture the “in” or “out” position that this variable
seeks to capture, we grouped Lewis’s (2003) variables into two categories.
His categories 1 and 2 are now scored as “subject to direct presidential
power” (1) or not (0). The categories 4 and 5 are scored as “politically
insulated” (1) or not (0). The middle category, which is rather amorphous
in terms of the types of organizations it contains, serves as the baseline
category.
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15. World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the war in Iraq (the
second Persian Gulf War) all qualify as major wars in that they spanned
multiple years.
16. Lewis also includes uniﬁed government and an interaction between uniﬁed
government, unfriendly House, and unfriendly president. We omit the triple
interaction because for our cases, the combination of an unfriendly House
and president always implies uniﬁed government. Inclusion of the two-way
interaction between unfriendly House and president usually resulted in
estimation problems, as these variables pushed the likelihood function to
one, thus resulting in astronomical parameter estimates and inﬁnitesimally
small standard errors. Whether we include or exclude this interaction does
not affect the estimates for the design variables very much.
17. Compared with parametric survival models, the Cox model does not require
any assumptions about the baseline hazard, a helpful feature because we do
not have strong theory to suggest a particular distributional assumption.
18. Like Lewis (2003), we here assume that location is continuous. Treating it as
categorical and using the ﬁrst category (located in the executive ofﬁce) as the
baseline, however, it becomes obvious that almost all of the location effect is
due to the contrast with this category. Speciﬁcally, the contrasts with catego-
ries 3 and 4 are signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level, while that with category 5 is
signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. The associated coefﬁcients are all in the expected
negative direction. However, none of the remaining contrasts are signiﬁcant.
That is, there are no signiﬁcant changes in the hazard between agencies in
categories 2 versus 3, 2 versus 4, 2 versus 5, 3 versus 4, 3 versus 5, or 4 versus
5. It thus seems that it would sufﬁce to include a simple dichotomy: Agen-
cies closest to the president versus all other types (see the variable insulation,
which is our recode of this variable).
19. Even after omitting the time-varying effects of relief and distributive orga-
nization type the statistical importance of the additional controls is evident:
Wald c2 = 19.39, P < 0.01.
20. Indeed, when this time variation is not taken into consideration only insu-
lation reaches statistical signiﬁcance as a main effect (results available upon
request).
21. Being a relief organization is also statistically signiﬁcant, but we consider
this predictor to be more about the mission than about the design of an
organization.
22. We thank Frank de Zwart for suggesting this alternative explanation.
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APPENDIX
List of Organizations in Population
Organization
Creation
date
Termination
date
Central Bank for Cooperatives (Cobank) 1933 Still exists
Commodity Credit Corporation 1933 Still exists
Export Import Bank 1934 Still exists
Farm Credit Administration 1933 Still exists
Federal Communications Commission 1934 Still exists
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 1933 Still exists
Foreign Trade Zones Board 1934 Still exists
Indian Arts and Crafts Board 1935 Still exists
National Archives Establishment (NARA) 1934 Still exists
National Historical Publications Commission 1934 Still exists
National Labor Relations Board 1934 Still exists
Procurement Division (Federal Supply Service) 1933 Still exists
Railroad Retirement Board 1934 Still exists
Securities and Exchange Commission 1934 Still exists
Social Security Administration 1935 Still exists
Tennessee Valley Authority 1933 Still exists
District of Columbia-Virginia Boundary Commission 1934 1935
National Recovery Administration 1933 1935
Ofﬁce of the General Council 1934 1935
Petroleum Administration 1933 1935
Science Advisory Board 1933 1935
Bituminous Coal Labor Board 1935 1936
Federal Alcohol Control Administration 1933 1935
Federal Coordinator of Transportation 1933 1936
Second Export-Import Bank 1934 1936
National Steel Labor Relations Board 1934 1937
Textile Labor Relations Board 1934 1937
Central Statistical Board 1933 1939
National Bituminous Coal Commission 1935 1939
National Reemployment Service 1933 1938
Special Mexican Claims Commission 1935 1938
National Emergency Council 1933 1939
National Power Policy Committee 1934 1939
Prison Industries Reorganization Administration 1935 1938
Savings and Loan Division 1935 1939
Federal Prison Industries Incorporated 1934 1940
Federal Surplus Commodities/Relief Corporation 1933 1940
Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation 1934 1941
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Organization
Creation
date
Termination
date
Civilian Conservation Corps 1933 1942
Electric Home and Farm Authority 1933 1937
Housing Division (of the PWA) 1933 1937
Federal Emergency Relief Administration 1933 1938
National (Resources) Planning Board 1933 1943
National Youth Administration 1935 1943
Public Works Administration 1933 1943
Works Progress Administration 1935 1942
Agricultural Adjustment Administration 1933 1945
Resettlement Administration 1935 1946
Division of Grazing Control 1934 1946
Joint Economy Board 1933 1947
RFC mortgage company 1935 1947
National Archives Council 1934 1950
Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine 1934 1953
Home Owner Loan Corporation 1933 1947
Land Bank Commissioner 1933 1953
Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration 1935 1953
Production Credit Corporation and Associations 1933 1957
Committee for Reciprocity Information 1934 1963
Federal Housing Administration 1934 1965
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 1934 1989
Rural Electriﬁcation Administration 1935 1994
Soil Conservation Service 1933 1994
Immigration and Naturalization Service 1933 2002
410 ARJEN BOIN ET AL.
